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Introduction
Congress' paramount goal in enacting the Copyright Act is
to "encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and
musical expression for the good of the public."' This goal is pro-
moted "by discouraging infringement as well as by the success-
ful defense of copyright infringement actions."2 One of the
defenses often asserted by a defendant in a copyright infringe-
ment case is that the plaintiff lacks standing to sue for the al-
leged copyright infringement. Under Article III of the
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1. Arcightz & Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 356, 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994)).
2. Id. at 364.
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Constitution, a plaintiff must "have 'standing' to invoke the
power of a federal court."3 The Copyright Act of 1909 granted a
copyright proprietor standing to sue for copyright infringe-
ment.4 The term "proprietor" was not defined in the 1909 Act.
However, courts had construed the term to mean "the 'sole
owner' of the copyright."5 With the introduction of the divisibil-
ity of copyright ownership, the Copyright Act of 1976 has ex-
tended standing to sue for copyright infringement to exclusive
licensees of copyrights. Under section 501(b) of the Copyright
Act of 1976, "[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right
under a copyright is entitled ... to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she
is the owner of it."6 Thus, both owners and exclusive licensees
of a copyright have standing to sue for copyright infringement.
However, both the 1909 and 1976 Acts are silent on whether the
owners or exclusive licensees may transfer to a third party their
accrued claims for prior infringement while retaining the copy-
right ownership and thereby enable the third party to sue for
the copyright infringement in their shoes.
The federal circuit courts are split on this question. In
Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that an
assignee of an accrued cause of action for prior infringement
with no ownership in the copyright has the right to maintain an
action for the infringement under section 101 of the 1909 Copy-
right Act.7 The court reasoned that the assignment is a "simple
assignment of a chose in action" and such an assignee, "whether
a 'proprietor' or not, has standing to sue and the court has effec-
tive power to avoid altogether the risk of double suit or double
recovery."8 Courts in other circuits, however, have rejected this
approach. In Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., the
Second Circuit ruled that Eden Toys would have standing to
sue for infringement of its assignor's copyright if Eden Toys
could prove that it was the exclusive licensee of the copyright
3. Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., 830 F. Supp. 614, 619 (N.D.
Ga. 1993) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
4. The Copyright Act of 1909 § 101(b) (amended 1976), reprinted in 8 MEL-
VILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 6 (2006).
5. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 896 (9th Cir. 2005).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006).
7. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1969).
8. Id. at 699-700.
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infringed.9 The court explained that "[t]he Copyright Act autho-
rizes only two types of claimants to sue for copyright infringe-
ment: (1) owners of copyrights, and (2) persons who have been
granted exclusive licenses by owners of copyrights." 10 The court
noted that it did "not believe that the Copyright Act permits
holders of rights under copyrights to choose third parties to
bring suits on their behalf." More recently, in Silvers v. Sony
Pictures Entertainment, Inc., an en banc panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit announced that an assignee of an accrued claim for copy-
right infringement with no legal or beneficial interest in the
copyright itself could not institute an action for infringement
under the 1976 Copyright Act.12 The court acknowledged that
the Act "does not say expressly that only a legal or beneficial
owner of an exclusive right is entitled to sue."1 3 Applying the
doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to interpret the
Copyright Act, the court, however, argued that "Congress' ex-
plicit listing of who may sue for copyright infringement should
be understood as an exclusion of others from suing for
infringement.' 4
In enacting the Copyright Act, Congress expressed a clear
intent to have national uniformity in copyright laws.' 5 As a
consequence of the split among the federal circuit courts, Con-
gress' goal has been undermined. In addition, a difference of
opinion among the circuit courts could lead to forum shopping,
another problem that the Copyright Act was designed to
prevent.
This Commentary surveys the circuit courts' approaches to
whether an assignee of an accrued infringement claim with no
other interest in the copyright itself has standing to sue for the
infringement and suggests that the Fifth Circuit's approach to
allow such an assignee to sue for the infringement is consistent
with the Copyright Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Part I provides a general discussion of the standing provi-
9. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982).
10. Id. at 32.
11. Id. at 32 n.3.
12. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005).
13. Id. at 885.
14. Id.
15. Synteck Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 781 (9th
Cir. 2002).
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sions of the Copyright Act, the "real party in interest"
requirement under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
moral rights as authors' inalienable rights to control the even-
tual fate of their works and their protection under the Berne
Convention. Part II reviews case law dealing with a third party
assignee's standing to sue for the assignor's accrued infringe-
ment claim under the Copyright Act. Part III argues that an
assignee of an accrued claim for copyright infringement is a real
party in interest and that such an assignee's right to sue for
copyright infringement is an independent right severable from
the copyright itself under the Copyright Act. Part III also ex-
plains that the differences in the nature of copyrights and pat-
ent rights and in the invalidation risk between copyright and
patent litigations necessitate different treatments in copyright
and patent infringement cases. Part IV presents additional rea-
sons to allow the third party assignee to sue for the accrued in-
fringement claim when such an assignee is also the creator of
the copyright. Part V concludes that the Copyright Act should
be interpreted to allow an assignee of an accrued claim for copy-
right infringement with no other interest in the copyright itself
to sue for the infringement in the assignor's shoes. Particu-
larly, when such an assignee is also the creator of the copyright,
the purpose of copyright law and the author's moral rights as
protected under the Berne Convention provide further justifica-
tions in granting the assignee standing to sue for copyright
infringement.
I. Standing Provisions under the Copyright Act, the "Real
Party in Interest" Requirement and Authors'
Moral Rights
A. The Copyright Act and Its Standing Provisions
The Copyright Act of 1909 adopted the doctrine of indivisi-
bility in copyright. 16 Under this doctrine, a copyright was an
indivisible bundle of rights and only one person or entity could
own the copyright. The Act referred to such a person or entity
as "the copyright proprietor." 7 A transfer of anything less than
16. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2002).
17. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 10.01[A] (2006).
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the entire copyright was a license, not an assignment.18 The
purpose of the indivisibility doctrine was "to protect alleged in-
fringers from the harassment of successive law suits."19
Section 101 of the 1909 Act provided:
[iif any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected
under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall
be liable ... [tio pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as
the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringe-
ment, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have
made from such infringement .... 20
Thus, the Act granted the right to seek damages for in-
fringement solely to the owner of the copyright. Under section
101(b) of the 1909 Act, an assignee of the copyright was a pro-
prietor and therefore had standing to sue for infringement. On
the other hand, a licensee of the copyright did not have standing
to bring an infringement action without joining the copyright
owner because he did not acquire the proprietorship of the
copyright. 21
The justification of the indivisibility doctrine eventually
proved to be "far outweighed by the impeding effect it had upon
commerce in copyrighted works."22 With the subsequently de-
veloped media of communications, such as motion pictures, tele-
vision, phonograph records and legitimate stage productions
coming into existence, copyright eventually became "a label for
a collection of diverse property rights each of which is sepa-
rately marketable."23 In 1976, after nearly two decades of delib-
eration and drafting, Congress passed the Copyright Act of
1976, which came into effect in 1978. The 1976 Act largely abol-
ished the doctrine of indivisibility and allows the copyright own-
ership to be divided and separately transferred and owned by
multiple parties.24
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The Copyright Act of 1909, § 101(b) (amended 1976), reprinted in 8 MEL-
VILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 6 (2006).
21. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, at § 10.01[C][1].
22. Id. at § 10.01[A].
23. Id.
24. Section 201(d)(2) provides:
Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivi-
sion of any of the rights specified in section 106, may be transferred.., and
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Section 501(b) of the 1976 Act provides that "[t]he legal or
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is enti-
tled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that par-
ticular right committed while he or she is the owner of it."25
Since an exclusive licensee is considered to be the owner of the
particular right he has licensed, the licensee has standing to
sue for any infringement of that right in his own name. Thus,
the 1976 Act expands the definition of persons who may sue for
infringement to include an exclusive licensee. Recognizing the
continued need to protect an alleged infringer from a multiplic-
ity of law suits and the need to safeguard the rights of other
owners of the copyright, Congress noted that section 501(b) "en-
ables the owner of a particular right to bring an infringement
action in that owner's name alone, while at the same time in-
suring to the extent possible that the other owners whose rights
may be affected are notified and given a chance to join the ac-
tion. '26 On the other hand, a nonexclusive licensee still does not
have standing to sue "in his own name even for infringement of
rights as to which he is a licensee."27
B. The "Real Party in Interest" Requirement under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must
have "standing" to invoke the power of a federal court.28 The
Supreme Court has said, "In essence the question of standing is
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the mer-
its of the dispute or of the particular issues."29 However, "[t]he
standing doctrine, which 'has been very much tied to litigation
asserting the illegality of governmental action,' is of limited ap-
plicability in cases between private parties."30 "Claims of pri-
owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to
the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the
copyright owner by this title.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2006).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006).
26. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159 (1976).
27. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, at § 10.02[B] [1].
28. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
29. Id. at 750-51 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
30. Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami N.A., 922 F.2d 666, 670 (lth Cir. 1991)
(citing 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1351 (2d ed. 1984)).
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vate wrongdoing ordinarily are asserted by persons obviously
having the enforceable interest, if anyone has; such problems as
arise commonly are handled in terms of defining private causes
of action or identifying the real party in interest."31
Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that "[elvery action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest."32 The basic purpose of Rule 17(a) is to protect
defendants "from subsequent similar actions by one not a party
to the initial action."33 Rule 17(a) also ensures finality of judg-
ment of the court.34
C. Authors' Moral Rights
Moral rights are commonly viewed to have evolved from
French case law and German legal theory.35 The term "moral
rights" is a translation of the French expression "droit moral"
and is used to describe an author's ability to control the even-
tual fate of his work.36 Moral rights are defined as the "legal
recognition of non-economic interests of the author. '37 The con-
cept of moral rights rests on the presumed intimate bond ex-
isting between authors and their works. 38 The basic theory of
moral rights is that "authors of copyrightable works have ina-
lienable rights in their works that protect their moral or per-
sonal interests and that supplement the set of economic rights
traditionally granted to copyright holders in all jurisdictions."39
Thus, an author's moral rights are separate from his copyright
and are retained by the author even after he has transferred the
copyright ownership to another.40
31. Id.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
33. Pac. Coast Agric. Exp. Assoc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196,
1208 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 84 (4th Cir. 1973)).
34. E. Michael Johnson, Note, The Real Party under Rule 17(a): The Loan Re-
ceipt and Insurers' Subrogation Revisited, 74 MiNN. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (1990).
35. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353,
356 (2006).
36. Betsy Rosenblatt, Moral Rights Basics, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/prop-
erty/library/moralprimer.html (last visited Sep. 22, 2007).
37. Rigamonti, supra note 35, at 355 n.10.
38. Id. at 355.
39. Id.
40. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights:
A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997).
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Four distinct rights are embedded in an author's moral
rights: the right of integrity, the right of attribution, the right of
disclosure and the right of withdrawal.41 The right of integrity
is viewed as the most important moral right. Under the right of
integrity, an author can prevent modifications of his work with-
out his consent, regardless of whether the modifications benefit
or negatively impact his work. The right of attribution provides
an author the right to claim authorship to his work and to pro-
hibit distributing or publishing his work unless the author's
name is affixed to the work. The right of disclosure gives an
author the right to decide when his work is complete and ready
for publication and distribution. Finally, after an author has
released his work to the public, the right of withdrawal entitles
the author to retract his work from the public if he feels the
work no longer reflects his personal conviction.42
Moral rights gained widespread international recognition
in the 1920s. In 1928, the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention") expressly
incorporated a moral rights provision at the Rome revision con-
ference. 43 The first paragraph of Article 6bis of the Berne Con-
vention provides:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.44
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention is universally under-
stood as codifying rights of integrity and attribution. Thus, the
Berne Convention protects only the right of integrity and the
right of attribution.45
41. Id. at 95-96.
42. Id.; see also Rigamonti, supra note 35, at 362-68.
43. Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The Concordance of Copyright
Law and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. ME-
DIA & ENT. L.J. 601 (2001).
44. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July
24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 6bis(1) [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
45. Gunlicks, supra note 43, at 608.
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American law had historically failed to make explicit provi-
sion recognizing authors' moral rights.46 For a long time, the
United States refused to join the Berne Convention, in part due
to its objection to the moral right clause. However, in 1988, the
United States reversed its position and acceded to the Berne
Convention. 47 Upon ratification of the Berne Convention, the
United States claimed that "U.S. law had evolved to the point
where it could be construed, as a whole, to provide the minimal
protection for artists' moral rights required by the Convention
....48 In 1990, Congress enacted the Visual Artists Right Acts
(VARA) which explicitly provides protection to visual artists'
moral rights of integrity and attribution.49 Nearly a dozen
states now explicitly recognize an author's moral rights.50 In
addition, commentators have also noted that American courts
have at times extended protections to authors' moral rights
"through extension of common-law rights or through expansive
interpretation of particular statutory rights, such as the trade-
mark laws. '51
II. Case Law on Assignee's Standing to Sue for Another's
Accrued Copyright Infringement Claim
A. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc.
In Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., plaintiff Prather au-
thored nine books. 52 Through a publishing agreement, Prather
retained the copyright on one of the books and his publisher,
Fawcett Publications, Inc. ("Fawcett"), obtained the copyright
on the remaining books.53 Later, it was discovered that defen-
dant Neva Paperbacks ("Neva") infringed on Fawcett's copy-
right by plagiarizing some of the books.5 4 Prather and Fawcett
then entered into a contract by which Fawcett assigned to
Prather "all its right, title and interest in and to the copyright
46. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 40, at 96-97.
47. Id. at 97.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698, 698-99 (5th Cir. 1969).
53. Id. at 699.
54. Id. at 698-99.
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secured by it" on the infringed books and "any and all causes of
action that may have... accrued in Fawcett's favor for infringe-
ment of said copyright."55 The contract also specified that
Prather simultaneously granted to Fawcett an exclusive license
to publish these books in the English language throughout the
world.5 6 Thus, through the contract, Fawcett assigned all
causes of action and some portion of the copyright on these
books to Prather, but retained the English language rights for
these books throughout the world to itself. Subsequently,
Prather brought a copyright infringement case against Neva.57
Neva moved to dismiss the case claiming that Prather did not
have standing to sue without joining Fawcett.58
The case predated the 1976 Act, and the Prather court ap-
plied the Copyright Act of 1909. Section 101 of the 1909 Act
granted to the sole owner of a copyright standing to sue for cop-
yright infringement. 59 Neva argued primarily that, since
Fawcett retained some portion of the copyright to the books,
Prather was a mere copyright licensee without the status of a
sole owner of the copyright and therefore not one entitled to sue
for infringement. 60
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision to deny
Neva's motion to dismiss and held that Prather had standing to
sue for copyright infringement without joinder of Fawcett. 61
The Fifth Circuit explained that the contract between Prather
and Fawcett was an effective assignment of accrued causes of
action for copyright infringement.6 2 "As an assignee of the
causes of action for infringement damages, past, present and fu-
ture, Prather has the right to maintain the action" under sec-
tion 101 of the 1909 Copyright Act.63 "There is no public policy
against such assignment and under F.R. Civ.P. 17 such as-
signee of all choses in action for infringement, whether a 'pro-
prietor' or not, has standing to sue and the court has effective
55. Id. at 699.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 698.
58. Id.
59. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 896 (9th Cir. 2005).
60. Prather, 410 F.2d at 699.
61. Id. at 698.
62. Id. at 700.
63. Id.
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power to avoid altogether the risk of double suit or double
recovery."64
B. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co.
In Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Padding-
ton and Company, Limited ("Paddington") was the copyright
owner of the fictional character Paddington Bear, which was
the central figure in a series of children's books. 65 Paddington
entered into a license agreement with plaintiff Eden Toys, Inc.
("Eden") granting to Eden an exclusive right to produce and
sublicense all Paddington products except books, tapes and
records, stage plays, motion pictures and radio and television
productions in North America. 66 Eden later discovered that de-
fendant Florelee Undergarment Co. ("Florelee") was using the
Paddington Bear figure in adult nightshirts it sold.67 Eden sued
Florelee for copyright infringement. 68 Florelee moved for sum-
mary judgment dismissing the copyright claim. 69 The trial
court granted Florelee's motion on the ground that Eden was
not an exclusive licensee of the copyright that Florelee had
infringed. 70
The Second Circuit held that the Copyright Act of 1976 only
allows owners and exclusive licensees of a copyright to sue for
infringement. 71 The original Paddington-Eden license agree-
ment did not cover the copyright Florelee infringed-using Pad-
dington Bear on adult clothing. But if the trial court could find
that Paddington granted an informal exclusive license to sell
Paddington Bear products in adult clothing to Eden and later
confirmed it in writing, Eden would be an exclusive licensee of
the copyright and therefore be entitled to sue for the infringe-
ment. 72 The Second Circuit then reversed the trial court's judg-
64. Id.
65. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 29 (2d Cir.
1982).
66. Id. at 29-30.
67. Id. at 30-31.
68. Id. at 31.
69. Id.
70. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 526 F. Supp. 1187
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
71. Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 32.
72. Id. at 36.
11
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ment dismissing Eden's claim of copyright infringement and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 73
C. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.
In Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., plaintiff Sil-
vers, a writer and producer of television movies, wrote the
script for a made-for-television movie entitled The Other Wo-
man, which was broadcast on CBS in 1995. 74 Because the script
was a work-for-hire that Silvers completed on behalf of Frank
and Bob Films II ("Frank & Bob"), Silvers did not own the copy-
right to the work. Rather, Frank & Bob remained the original
owner of the copyright to the movie. 75 In 1998, defendant Sony
Pictures Entertainment, Inc. ("Sony") released the motion pic-
ture Stepmom.76 Silvers thought that Stepmom infringed the
copyright to The Other Woman. Thereafter, Frank & Bob exe-
cuted an "Assignment of Claims and Causes of Action," as-
signing to Silvers "all right, title and interest in and to any
claims and causes of action against Sony... with respect to the
screenplay 'The Other Woman' . . . and the motion picture
'Stepmom.' ' 77 Frank & Bob retained the copyright ownership to
The Other Woman.78 Silvers then filed a complaint against
Sony alleging Stepmom infringed on the copyright of The Other
Woman.79 Sony moved to dismiss, claiming that Silvers lacked
standing to bring the copyright infringement suit.80
The trial court denied Sony's motion, but allowed the issue
for interlocutory appeal.81 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court's decision, relying on the rationale
established in Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc.8 2 The panel
stated that "Congress codified pre-existing case law that had
developed under the 1909 Copyright Act into the standing pro-
73. Id. at 37.
74. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 330 F.3d 1204, 1205-06 (9th Cir.
2003).
75. Id. at 1206.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss1/4
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visions of §501(b) [of the 1976 Copyright Act]."83 However, the
Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc and withdrew
the panel opinion. 84 Following the rehearing, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the trial court's decision by a seven-to-four margin.85
The Supreme Court denied certiorari to hear the case.86
The Ninth Circuit held that an assignee of an accrued claim
for copyright infringement, having no legal or beneficial inter-
est in the copyright itself, does not have standing to sue for in-
fringement.87 The court relied on section 501(b) of the 1976
Copyright Act to establish "who is legally authorized to sue for
infringement of a copyright."88 It acknowledged that the Copy-
right Act "does not say expressly that only a legal or beneficial
owner of an exclusive right is entitled to sue."89 However, ap-
plying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius, the
court argued that "Congress' explicit listing of who may sue for
copyright infringement should be understood as an exclusion of
others from suing for infringement."90
Recognizing the statute's "omission explicitly to address the
present question may create an ambiguity,"91 the court then an-
alyzed the legislative history of the standing provisions of the
1976 Act.92 The court concluded that although the 1976 Act al-
lowed a copyright to be divided and separately owned, it "did
not alter the requirement that only owners of an exclusive right
in the copyright could bring suit."93 The court next looked at
patent law and suggested that the Copyright Act should be in-
terpreted consistently with the requirement of the Patent Act. 94
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Crown Die & Tool
Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, which precluded assignment of
causes of action for patent infringement separate from the pat-
83. Id. (citing Moran v. London Records, Ltd., 827 F.2d 180, 183 (7th Cir.
1987)).
84. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 370 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2004).
85. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005).
86. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 546 U.S. 827 (2005).
87. Silvers, 402 F.3d 881.
88. Id. at 884.
89. Id. at 885.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 885-87.
93. Id. at 886.
94. Id. at 888.
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ent ownership, the court reasoned that the Copyright Act
should be interpreted likewise to prevent such assignments. 95
In the first dissenting opinion, Judge Berzon explained that
the language of section 501(b) was not conclusive in "deciding
the viability of assignments of accrued rights to sue for copy-
right infringement. '" 96 Focusing on Congress' overall intent in
enacting the 1976 Copyright Act, Judge Berzon argued that Sil-
vers, as the original creator of the copyright, should be permit-
ted to pursue the accrued claims assigned to her because the
creator is "the person for whom the copyright system is de-
signed to provide incentives for more creations," while "a com-
plete stranger to the creative process" should not.97 Judge
Berzon also pointed out that the legal and factual differences
between Crown Die and Silvers were significant enough to
render the patent case inapplicable to the Silvers case.98
In the second dissent, Judge Bea opined that "the text, pur-
pose and history of the 1976 Copyright Act 0 allow.., assignees
of an accrued copyright claim to sue for infringement. '" 99 Judge
Bea argued that in enacting the 1976 Act, Congress intended to
"enlarge the ability to bring suit to the owners of exclusive
rights."100 In addition, allowing assignees of accrued claims to
sue for infringement is also consistent with common law and
courts' decisions where other federal statutes are involved. 101
Judge Bea further argued that Crown Die is not analogous to
the Silvers case in light of differences between the patent and
copyright law. 10 2 Lastly, Judge Bea noted that case law sup-
ports the interpretation that the Copyright Act allows an as-
signee of accrued claims to sue for copyright infringement. 10 3
95. Id. at 887.
96. Id. at 891.
97. Id. at 891-94.
98. Id. at 894-95.
99. Id. at 895.
100. Id. at 899.
101. Id. at 902-03.
102. Id. at 903-05.
103. Id. at 907-11.
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III. A Third Party Assignee's Standing to Sue Is Consistent
with the Copyright Act and the "Real Party in
Interest" Requirement
A. Section 501(b) Cannot and Should Not be Interpreted to
Allow Only a Person in the Specified Class to Sue for
Copyright Infringement
Section 501(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act specifies a class of
people who have standing to sue for copyright infringement.
Under section 501(b), "[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an ex-
clusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the re-
quirements of section 411, to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she
is the owner of it. ' 104 Thus, the class of people specified in sec-
tion 501(b) are only those legal or beneficial owners who owned
the copyright at the time of infringement. Owners who have
acquired their legal or beneficial interest in the copyright after
the time of infringement are not included in the class specified
in section 501(b).
Although section 501(b) does not say expressly that only a
certain class of people may sue for copyright infringement, the
majority in Silvers, relying on the doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusion alterius, concluded that the Copyright Act allows only
those people specified in section 501(b) to sue for copyright in-
fringement. 105 One consequence of the Silvers court's interpre-
tation of section 501(b) would be that only the legal or beneficial
owners who owned the copyright at the time of infringement
may sue for infringement. Owners who purchased a copyright
after the time of infringement would be prohibited from suing
for infringement. This is inconsistent with case law and would
lead to absurd results.
Courts have long recognized that a purchaser of a copyright
could sue for infringement accrued before purchase, so long as
the right to bring the accrued claims is expressly transferred
along with the copyright. 10 6 For example, in ABKCO, plaintiff
104. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
105. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885.
106. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d
Cir. 1991); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933); Wade Williams
Distrib., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 5002, 2005 WL 774275 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 5, 2005); Fisher v. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D.
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ABKCO purchased from Bright Tunes the copyright to the song
"He's So Fine" and "all rights assertable against infringing com-
positions" of the song.10 7 ABKCO then proceeded to sue the de-
fendant, Sony, for infringement that occurred before the
purchase1l 8 Under the Silvers court's interpretation of section
501(b), ABKCO would be barred from the lawsuit because it
was not the owner of the song when the infringement occurred
and thus did not fit into the class specified in section 501(b).
However, the Second Circuit held that ABKCO had standing to
sue for the infringement due to its ownership of the claims
themselves which it purchased along with the copyright. 10 9
In addition, the Silvers court's interpretation of section
501(b) would also lead to absurd results.110 As Judge Bea sug-
gested in his dissenting opinion, one scenario under this inter-
pretation would be that when an owner of the copyright dies,
his heirs would not be allowed to sue for an infringement claim
that accrued while he was alive."' Thus, the Silvers court's in-
terpretation of section 501(b) would effectively prevent the
alienation of the accrued claims for copyright infringement. 112
Courts traditionally have disfavored "restraint[s] on alienation"
of property rights. 1 3 Therefore, section 501(b) cannot and
should not be interpreted to allow only a person who is within
the class specified to sue for copyright infringement.
B. Right to Sue for an Accrued Claim for Copyright
Infringement is an Independent and Assignable Right
Courts generally have held that a copyright assignment
does not automatically convey with it accrued causes of action
for infringement that occurred prior to the assignment, unless
Colo. 1999); Intimo, Inc. v. Briefly Stated, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Kriger v. MacFadden Publ'ns, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); see generally
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, at § 12.02[B].
107. ABKCO Music, Inc., 944 F.2d at 975.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 980-81.
110. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 900-01.
111. Id. at 901.
112. Id. at 905.
113. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2003).
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they are expressly included in the assignment. 114 If the accrued
causes of action are not conveyed to the assignee, they would be
retained by the assignor. In this situation, "it is the assignor,
not assignee, who has the standing to sue for the infringement
acts . ... "115 Thus, the right to sue for an accrued claim for
copyright infringement is an independent right severable from
the copyright ownership itself.
As discussed in Section A, the right to sue for an accrued
copyright infringement claim could be transferred along with
the copyright itself to an assignee and the assignee is allowed to
sue in the assignor's shoes for the infringement that occurred
before the transfer. 1 6 In addition, in cases where the right to
sue for the accrued claim was not simultaneously transferred
during the copyright assignment, courts have allowed the as-
signor to subsequently convey this right to the assignee of the
copyright." 7 As long as the subsequent conveyance is "appro-
priately worded" and is done prior to trial, the assignee again
obtains standing to sue for the infringement that occurred prior
to the assignment."18 Therefore, not only is the right to sue for
an accrued copyright infringement claim completely severable
from the copyright itself, it is also independently assignable.
C. A Third Party Assignee of an Accrued Copyright Claim is
a Real Party in Interest
As discussed in Part I, the Constitutional standing require-
ment is often satisfied when a plaintiff claims a personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and likely to be re-
dressed by the requested relief.119 The actual question then is
114. See, e.g., Skor-Mor Prods. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 81 Civ. 1286,
1982 WL 1264 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1982); Co-Opportunities, Inc. v. Nat'l Broad. Co.,
510 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
115. Skor-Mor Prods., 1982 WL 1264, at *3.
116. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.
1991).
117. Seatrunk v. Darwell Integrated Tech., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-531-G, 2006 WL
1932342 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2006); Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co.,
830 F. Supp. 614 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
118. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, at § 12.02[B].
119. Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami N.A., 922 F.2d 666, 670 (11th Cir. 1991)
(citing 13 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1351, at 340-41 (2d ed. 1984)); see also Infodek,
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 614.
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
whether the plaintiff is a real party in interest within the mean-
ing of Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 120
Rule 17(a) requires that "[elvery action shall be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest."'12 1 The purpose of the
rule is "to protect defendants against a subsequent suit on a
cause of action previously adjudicated with another plaintiff.'1 22
However, the rule "does not bar a suit by a bona fide represen-
tative on behalf of real parties in interest which will have the
effect of preventing a multiplicity of suits." 123
Courts have held that an assignee of an accrued claim
"steps into the shoes of its assignors" and thus is a real party in
interest under Rule 17(a).124 In Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb
Printing Co., the court held that plaintiff Infodek, an assignee
of accrued copyright infringement claims, was a real party in
interest under Rule 17(a). 125 The court reasoned that the defen-
dant is not prejudiced by recognizing the plaintiffs right to sue
all accrued causes of action because "the threat of multiple liti-
gation is effectively removed."' 26 Based on the foregoing reason-
ing, a third party assignee is a real party in interest for the
accrued copyright claims and thus should be allowed to sue for
the copyright infringement.
D. Differences in the Nature of Copyrights and Patent Rights
and in the Invalidation Risk of Copyrights and
Patents in Litigations Necessitate a Different
Treatment in Copyright Cases
The Silvers court placed heavy weight on a patent case,
Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, to reach its
decision. 127 In Crown Die, the Supreme Court addressed the is-
sue of whether an assignee of an accrued patent infringement
120. Glickstein, 922 F.2d at 670.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
122. United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Watson, 409 F.2d 462, 470 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
123. Id. at 471.
124. Pac. Coast Agric. Exp. Assoc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196,
1208 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Dubuque Stone Prods. Co. v. Fred L. Gray Co., 356
F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1966); Infodek, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 614.
125. Infodek, 830 F. Supp. at 621.
126. Id.
127. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 887-88 (9th Cir.
2005).
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claim with no interest in the patent itself could sue for past in-
fringements. 128 Inventors Wright and Hubbard assigned their
right to a patent for a machine for forming screw-thread cutting
devices to Reed Manufacturing Company ("Reed"). 129 After dis-
covering that defendant Crown Die & Tool Company ("Crown
Die") had been manufacturing and using devices in infringe-
ment of the Wright and Hubbard patent, Reed entered into an
agreement with Crown Die's competitor, Nye Tool & Machine
Works ("Nye Tool"). 130 In the agreement, Reed assigned to Nye
Tool
all claims recoverable in law or in equity, whether for damages,
profits, savings, or any other kind or description which the Reed
Manufacturing Company has against the Crown Die & Tool Com-
pany arising out of the infringement by the Crown Die & Tool
Company of the Wright & Hubbard patent .... 131
Nye Tool then brought a suit to prevent Crown Die from practic-
ing the invention of the patent. 132 Crown Die moved to dismiss
the suit on the ground that Nye Tool did not have standing to
sue because the Reed-Nye Tool assignment conveyed to Nye
Tool only the right to sue for accrued causes of action for patent
infringement, not the patent.133
The Supreme Court ruled that Nye Tool could not sue for
accrued causes of action for past infringements without joining
the owner of the patent. 34 In reaching its decision, the Su-
preme Court explained that "the monopoly granted to the pat-
entee is for one entire thing and in order to enable an assignee
to sue he must have received the entire and unqualified monop-
oly in the territory specified." 135 "[Ilt was obviously not the in-
tention of the Legislature to permit several monopolies to be
made out of one, and divided among different persons within
the same limits." 136 Thus, the Supreme Court's holding that an
assignee of accrued causes of action did not have standing to
128. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24 (1923).
129. Id. at 24.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 26.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 27-28.
134. Id. at 39.
135. Id. at 38.
136. Id. (quoting Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 494 (1870)).
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sue for past infringement was predicated on the indivisibility of
patent rights.
The Supreme Court has noted that "patents and copyrights
do not entail the same exchange." 137 The patent law promul-
gated by the Supreme Court in Crown Die is inapplicable to cop-
yright cases due to the difference in the nature of copyrights
and patent rights. Copyrights protect the expression of ideas
and facts, whereas patents protect the ideas and facts them-
selves. 138 Copyrights give their holders "no monopoly on any
knowledge.' 1 39 "A reader of an author's writing may make full
use of any fact or idea she acquires from her reading."'140 "The
grant of a patent, on the other hand, does prevent full use by
others of the inventor's knowledge."' 4 '
Patent rights are generally considered indivisible, meaning
that the patent owner could assign only an undivided interest
in his property. 142 An assignment of the patent can be effected
by conveying either "the entire patent, an undivided part or
share of the entire patent, or all rights under the patent in a
specified geographical region of the United States."'143 A trans-
fer of anything less than one of these three interests is a license,
not an assignment. 44 An assignee of a patent has standing to
sue for patent infringement.145 A licensee, on the other hand,
does not acquire title in the patent and has no right to sue for
infringement at law in the licensee's own name.146
137. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2002).
138. Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-B-1854, 2005 WL 914754 at *12 (D. Colo. Apr.
20, 2005).
139. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doc-
trine in Intellectual Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1365 (2000).
143. 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.03[2] (1997) (quoting
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995)).
144. Blair & Cotter, supra note 142, at 1366; see also CHISUM, supra note 143,
at § 21.03[21 (1997).
145. An assignee of the entire patent or all rights under the patent in a speci-
fied geographical region of the United States may sue in its own name; an assignee
of an undivided part or share of the entire patent may sue jointly with the as-
signor. CHISUM, supra note 143, at § 21.03[2] (quoting Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at
1551-52).
146. Id.
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Unlike the patent law granting to a patentee an indivisible
patent right, the 1976 Copyright Act allows a single copyright
to be divided and separately owned by different persons. 147 Sec-
tion 201(d) of the 1976 Act provides:
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in
part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may
be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applica-
ble laws of intestate succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including
any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may
be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately.
The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the ex-
tent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to
the copyright owner by this title.148
Section 106 expressly lists six "exclusive rights" that a cop-
yright owner could own or transfer. 149 As a result of the empha-
sis on the divisibility of copyrights, courts have allowed the
assignee of any one or more of these exclusive rights to sue for
infringement without necessarily joining any other persons as
plaintiffs. 150 Courts have also granted the exclusive licensee of
one or more of these exclusive rights standing to sue for in-
fringement without necessarily joining the transferor. 151 Fur-
thermore, section 501(b) "confers standing upon a 'beneficial
147. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 905 (9th Cir. 2005).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006).
149. Under 17 U.S.C. § 106, the owner of a copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individ-
ual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy-
righted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
150. Blair & Cotter, supra note 142, at 1368.
151. Id. at 1368-69
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owner' of a copyright" and the legislative history states that a
beneficial owner would include an "author who had parted with
legal title to the copyright in exchange for percentage royalties
based on sales or license fees." 152 This suggests that "an as-
signee with a continuing interest in the assigned property may
commence an infringement action in his own right, an option
that appears to be impossible in patent law."153 Thus, under the
1976 Copyright Act, Congress obviously intended to "permit
several monopolies to be made out of one [copyright], and di-
vided among different persons within the same limits." 154 This
is in direct "contrast to the Chief Justice's 1923 reading of an
1874 Patent Law" in Crown Die.155 The difference in the nature
of copyrights and patent rights therefore prevents the patent
law established in Crown Die from being applied to copyright
cases.
In addition, there is probably a much lower risk for a copy-
right to be invalidated in litigation than a patent. 156 In order to
be a valid patent, an invention must be novel, nonobvious and
useful. 157 An invention is deemed to be "novel" if it was not pub-
licly known or published at the time the invention was made. 158
An invention is "nonobvious" if it would not have been obvious
to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time it was
made. 159 An invention is deemed "useful" if it is "capable of ben-
eficial and practical application. '" 160
Unlike patents, "[t]he sine qua non of copyright is original-
ity."161- It has been clearly established, "both as a matter of con-
gressional intent and judicial construction, that the originality
152. Id. at 1369 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 159 (1976)).
153. Id. at 1369.
154. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 38
(1923).
155. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 904 (9th Cir. 2005).
156. Blair & Cotter, supra note 142 at 1372.
157. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2006).
158. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
159. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
160. Adam Macluckie, United States v. Microsoft: Look at the Balancing Act
between Copyright Protection for Software, Intellectual Property Rights and the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 2 Hous. Bus. & TAx. L. J. 415, 429 (2002) (quoting Aaron
Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits on the Intellectual Property Mo-
nopoly, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 6 (1998)).
161. Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
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necessary to support a copyright merely calls for independent
creation, not novelty."'162 A work may be original and qualified
for copyright protection "even though it closely resembles other
works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of
copying."163 Thus, "copyrights are easier to obtain than patents,
because originality is more easily proven than is novelty. ' 164
Furthermore, "many patents are declared invalid in litiga-
tion, mostly on non-obvious grounds, a challenge that is un-
available against a copyright."1 65 The lack of nonobvious
ground, plus the lower standard of originality, probably renders
a copyright much less likely to be invalidated during litigation
than a patent. 66 The much lower risk of invalidation thus
makes it unnecessary to require the owner to be a party of any
copyright infringement action, a rule that is generally exercised
in the patent infringement lawsuits. 167 Therefore, the differ-
ence in risk of invalidation of copyrights and patents in litiga-
tions also entails a different treatment in copyright
infringement actions.
IV. Additional Reasons to Grant Standing When the
Assignee Is Also the Creator of the Copyright
A. Granting An Author Standing to Sue for Infringement of
His Works is Consistent with the General Goals of the
Copyright Law
The Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have
power [t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries.' ' 68 Based
on the power bestowed by the Constitution, Congress enacted
the Copyright Act. "The primary objective of the Copyright Act
is to 'encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and
162. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.01[A] (2006).
163. Feist Pub'ns, 499 U.S. at 345.
164. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 162, at § 2.01[A].
165. Blair & Cotter, supra note 142, at 1372 n.225 (quoting Paul J. Heald,
Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four Causes of Action, 1 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 259, 271 (1994)).
166. Almost half of all litigated patents are invalidated. Id. at 1372 n.225.
167. Id. at 1372.
168. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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musical expression for the good of the public."' 169 Through the
copyright law, Congress designed the copyright system to pro-
vide incentives for more creations. 170
An author generally has significant interests in how his
work is treated by others. Author's interests in his work con-
tinue even after he parts from the ownership of his work. When
his work is infringed by a third party, the author may desire to
prosecute the infringement even when the copyright owner does
not. 171 If the infringement remains unchallenged, it "could alter
the original work in a way that could damage the creator's repu-
tation or prestige, upon which the creator may very well depend
for future contracts or employment. '" 172 In this situation, even
though the author does not suffer any current financial damage
from the infringement, the unchallenged infringement may well
affect his future economic interests. Thus, allowing an author
to sue as an assignee of the accrued claim for infringement of
his work would preserve the financial incentives for him to cre-
ate more works for the public in the future. 73 This is what the
copyright law is designed to achieve. Denying an author's right
to sue as an assignee for the accrued copyright infringement
claim undermines this purpose and thus is inconsistent with
the general goals of the copyright law.
B. An Author's Moral Rights Demand Standing to Sue for
Infringement of His Work
Authors have intrinsic moral rights interests in their works
that supplement the set of economic rights traditionally granted
to copyright owners through copyright law. 174 Authors' moral
rights interests are found "worthy of protection because of the
presumed intimate bond between authors and their works,
which are almost universally understood to be an extension of
169. Arclightz & Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 356, 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994)).
170. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 893 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Berzon, J., dissenting).
171. Recent Cases, Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 402 F.3d 881
(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 367 (2005), 119 HARv. L. REV. 693, 699
(2005).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Rigamonti, supra note 35, at 356.
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the author's personhood."1 75 An author's moral rights are ina-
lienable and thus remain with him even after he has assigned
the ownership of his work to another person.176
Authors' moral rights encompass four distinct rights: right
of integrity; right of attribution; right of disclosure; and right of
withdrawal. 177 The Berne Convention explicitly codified the
first two rights: rights of integrity and attribution. Under Arti-
cle 6bis of the Berne Convention, an "author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distor-
tion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory ac-
tion in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to
his honor or reputation."1 7 8 An infringement to an author's
work falls into the category of actions defined in Article 6bis of
the Berne Convention. Thus, under Article 6bis, authors would
have the right to sue for the infringement, regardless of
whether they are the copyright owners of their works or not.
As a member of the Berne Convention, the United States
has obligations to enforce authors' moral rights specified in Ar-
ticle 6bis of the Berne Convention.17 9 In addition, since the ma-
jority of countries in the world have now recognized moral
rights, the United States' refusal to effectively implement them
"continues to be a significant barrier to further international
agreement on the basic protections of copyright law and contin-
ues to hinder the expansion of copyright right protection
throughout the globe." 80 Furthermore, effective protections of
moral rights in the U.S. and throughout the world would help to
protect works of American authors "from challenges caused by
technological innovation that do not fall within the traditional
scope of copyright law" and "'secure the highest available level'
of protection for American authors in the global market-
place."' 8 ' Based on these considerations, legislatures at both
federal and state levels have enacted laws to extend protections
175. Id. at 355-56.
176. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 40, at 96.
177. Id. at 95-96.
178. Berne Convention supra note 44.
179. Gunlicks, supra note 43, at 608.
180. Id. at 605.
181. Id. at 606 (quoting Ronald Reagan, President, Remarks on Signing the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (Oct. 31, 1988), in 24 WEEKLY
COMP. PRESS. Doc. 1405).
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
to author's moral rights in the past two decades. 8 2 For exam-
ple, Congress enacted the federal Visual Artists Rights Act to
protect the rights of integrity and attribution of visual artists. 183
Nearly a dozen states have now recognized author's moral
rights at various degrees. 84 In addition, "even in the absence of
specific legislation, American courts have at times offered pro-
tection for interests analogous to moral rights through exten-
sion of common-law rights or through expansive interpretation
of particular statutory rights .. ".. 185 As Judge Posner noted,
the doctrine of moral rights "is creeping into American copy-
right law."'186
An author's moral rights as protected under Article 6bis of
the Berne Convention demand granting to him the right to pre-
vent his work from being infringed. Courts should allow an as-
signee of an accrued copyright infringement claim who is also
the author of the copyright work to sue for the infringement.
Doing so would bring the United States a step closer into com-
pliance with the Berne Convention and would achieve greater
harmony between the U.S. law and that of the European
Community. 8 7
Conclusion
Different federal circuits have ruled differently on the issue
of whether an assignee of an accrued copyright infringement
claim, who has no other interest in the copyright itself, may sue
for the infringement under the Copyright Act. The Fifth Circuit
allowed such assignees to sue for the infringement on the
ground that the assignment is a "simple assignment of a chose
in action" and "the court has effective power to avoid altogether
the risk of double suit or double recovery." 88 The Second and
Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, interpreted that the Copy-
right Act of 1976 allows only owners or exclusive licensees of
182. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 40, at 97.
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188. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1969).
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copyrights to sue for copyright infringement. 8 9 Since such as-
signees are neither owners nor exclusive licensees of the copy-
right, they do not have standing to sue for the copyright
infringement. 190
The Fifth Circuit's ruling is compatible with the Copyright
Act and satisfies the "real party in interest" requirement of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 191 The interpretation that the
Copyright Act only allows a person specified in section 501(b) to
sue for copyright infringement is inconsistent with case law and
would lead to absurd results. Thus, section 501(b) cannot and
should not be interpreted to prevent persons other than owners
or exclusive licensees of copyrights from suing for infringement.
Copyright case law has also established that the right to sue for
an accrued copyright infringement claim is a right severable
from the copyright itself and is independently assignable. In
addition, the assignee of an accrued copyright infringement
claim is a real party in interest and thus satisfies the require-
ment of Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 192
Furthermore, although a bare assignee of a patent infringement
claim does not have standing to sue for the infringement under
patent law, the differences in the nature of copyrights and pat-
ent rights and in the invalidation risk of copyrights and patents
in litigations necessitate a different treatment in copyright in-
fringement cases.
When the assignee of an accrued copyright infringement
claim is also the creator of the copyright, there are additional
reasons favoring granting standing to sue for the infringement
to the assignee. Allowing the author to sue for copyright in-
fringement of his work would provide financial incentives for
him to create more works for the public in the future and thus
accords with the general goals of the copyright law. Further-
more, an author's moral rights as protected under the Berne
Convention also demand granting to him the right to prevent
others from infringing on his work.
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